



The 18th International Scientific Conference
**“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”**
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**A FUNCTIONAL ORDER EUROPEAN UNION STRATEGIC
COMPASS FOR SECURITY AND DEFENSE – CONSIDERATIONS**

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Abstract:

The world is changing every day and new challenges appear everywhere. The returning of war in Europe, the growing strategic competition and the complex security threats are disrupting the global-rules based order, violates international law, the principle of the UN charter and undermine European and global security and stability.

This paper intends to present the evolution of the European Union (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and of the EU Security and Defense Strategy, as well as the EU structures, instruments and agencies involved in the implementation of the CSDP.

In addition to this, the author will focus on the 2022 EU Strategic Compass on Defense and Security, which attempts to set the strategic vision of the Union in response to the current challenges and to enhance EU capacity to protect its citizens, values and interests and to contribute to the international peace and security.

Key words: Common Security and Defense Policy; EU structures, instruments and agencies involved in CSDP; EU Security and Defense Strategy; EU Strategic Compass for Defense and Security,

Introduction

Decades of declining defense budgets have led to a dramatic downsizing of European armed forces and generated major capability gaps. Competing national defense industries and diverging operational needs have also resulted in a deeply fragmented defense landscape where cooperative solutions are an exception, not the rule. Finally, endless debates on the need for, or the danger of, more European strategic autonomy have slowed down European ambitions.

The recently Russia’s brutal war of aggression in Ukraine has mobilized European nations to think more seriously about security and defense. In addition to sending an impressive amount of military equipment to Ukraine and making commitments at the Madrid summit to reinforce the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastern flank with troops and materiel, the European Union (EU) also took new steps in its evolution as a credible defense actor. Perhaps most critically, European nations have also announced substantial increases to their defense budgets²⁵.

There has been strong political will in Europe to take bolder steps, which have manifested in robust EU sanctions on Russia and support for Ukraine, including lethal and non-lethal aid and working to take in refugees—an area the European Union has found difficult in the past²⁶. With the recently released Strategic Compass for Security and Defense EU has sent signals of a higher level of ambition on the foreign and security policy.

²⁵ ‘Anyone Can Die at Any Time’: Indiscriminate attacks by Russian forces in Kharkiv, Ukraine,” Amnesty International, June 13, 2022, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/>

²⁶ European Commission, “Ukraine: €3.4 billion REACT-EU prefinancing to Member States welcoming refugees fleeing Ukraine,” Press release, March 23, 2022, <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/>



The 18th International Scientific Conference
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1. Evolution of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy

The idea of a common defense policy for Europe dates back to 1948 when the UK, France, and the Benelux signed the Treaty of Brussels.

The Western European Union (EUV) was the international organization and military alliance that succeeded the Western Union (WU) after the 1954 amendment of the 1948 Treaty of Brussels. The agreement included a mutual defense clause laying down the foundations for the creation of the Western European Union (EUV), which remained until the late 1990s, together with NATO, the principal forum for consultation and dialogue on security and defense in Europe. At the turn of the 21st century, after the end of the Cold War, EUV tasks and institutions were gradually transferred to the European Union (EU)²⁷.

On 9 of December 1991 the European Council in Maastricht lays the foundations for a political Union with the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the beginnings of a common defense policy, as the second pillar of the Treaty of Maastricht.

Following the conflicts in the Balkans, it became clear that the EU needed to assume its responsibilities in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. In 1998 the United Kingdom, which had traditionally opposed the introduction of European autonomous defense capacities, signed the Saint-Malo declaration. This marked a turning point as the declaration endorsed the creation of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), including a European military force capable of autonomous action²⁸. The declaration was a response to the Kosovo War in the late 1990s, in which the EU was perceived to have failed to intervene to stop the conflict²⁹. The conditions under which military units could be deployed were already agreed by the EUV Council in 1992.

The Treaty of Amsterdam was adopted by EU Member States in June 1997 and entered into force in May 1999. The EUV's so-called 'Petersberg Tasks'³⁰ were transferred to the EU and stated that the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), replacing the EUV's Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), would be 'progressively framed' on the basis of these tasks.

In June 1999, at the Cologne European Council, decided to incorporate the role of the EUV within the EU, effectively abandoning the EUV. The Cologne Council also appointed Javier Solana as the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy to help progress both the CFSP and the CSDP. On 20 November 1999 Solana was also appointed Secretary-General of the EUV. His being head of both organizations permits him to oversee the ongoing transfer of functions from the EUV to the EU.

²⁷ History and Future of CSDP with special Consideration onto EU Missions and Operations, Bachelor Thesis, created at the Theresan Military Academy, Austria, 2017

²⁸ "Franco-British St. Malo Declaration (4 December 1998)". 22 June 2015.

²⁹ Adam. "The Saint-Malo Declaration and its impact on ESDP after 10 years - Defense Viewpoints from UK Defense Forum". www.defenseviewpoints.co.uk.

³⁰ Humanitarian and rescue tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making; joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance tasks; post-conflict stabilisation tasks



***The 18th International Scientific Conference
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Originally, under the Amsterdam Treaty, the EEU was given an integral role in giving the EU an independent defense capability, playing a major role in the Petersberg tasks; however that situation is changing. On 13 November 2000, EEU Ministers met in Marseille and agreed to begin transferring the organization's capabilities and functions to the European Union, under its developing Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)³¹. On 1 January 2002, the EEU's Security Studies Institute and the Satellite Centre were transferred to the EU and became the European Union Institute for Security Studies and the European Union Satellite Centre.

On 16 of December 2002 the Berlin agreement from 1996 was amended with the so-called Berlin Plus agreement, which allowed the EU to also draw on some of NATO's assets in its own peacekeeping operations.

After the expansion of new ten countries in 2004, it was necessary to revise the institutional framework of the European Union. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed in Rome on the 29th October 2004 but would never enter into force.

After an unprecedented crisis, The Lisbon Treaty, in force since 01 December 2009, becomes the cornerstone in the development of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). It allowed for the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy/ Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP). The two distinct functions of the post give the HR/VP the possibility to bring all the necessary EU assets together and to apply a "comprehensive approach" to EU crisis management.

Under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the EU takes a leading role in peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention and the strengthening of international security. It is an integral part of the EU's comprehensive approach towards crisis management, drawing on civilian and military assets. Almost 4,000 women and men help to promote peace and security where needed, providing stability and building resilience in fragile environments. Since the first CSDP missions and operations were launched back in 2003, the EU has undertaken over 37 overseas operations, using civilian and military missions and operations in several countries in Europe, Africa and Asia. As of today, there are 18 ongoing CSDP missions and operations, 11 of which are civilian, and 7 military³².

2. Mutual assistance and solidarity clause by the Treaty of EU

The Lisbon Treaty, signed on 01 December 2009, came into force in December 2009. It amends the Maastricht Treaty (1992), known in updated form as the Treaty on European Union (2007) or TEU, as well as the Treaty of Rome (1957), known in updated form as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2007) or TFEU. It also amends the treaty's protocols as well as the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).

Treaty on European Union provides provisions for mutual assistance, as follows:

‘Art42.7. *If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in*

³¹ Marseille Declaration 2000

³² EEAS official site, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en



**The 18th International Scientific Conference
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IN THE 21st CENTURY”
Braşov, November 9th-10th 2023**



accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States.

Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defense and the forum for its implementation³³.

Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, establishes the solidarity clause as follows:

‘Article 222. 1. *The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military assets and capabilities made available by the Member States, to:*

(a) - *prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;*
- *protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;*
- *assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack;*

(b) *assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.*

2. *Should a Member State be the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster, the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities. To that end, the Member States shall coordinate between themselves in the Council.*

3. *The arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause shall be defined by a decision adopted by the Council acting on a joint proposal by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The Council shall act in accordance with Article 31(1) of the Treaty on European Union where this decision has defense implications. The European Parliament shall be informed.*

For the purposes of this paragraph and without prejudice to Article 240, the Council shall be assisted by the Political and Security Committee with the support of the structures developed in the context of the common security and defense policy and by the Committee referred to in Article 71; the two committees shall, if necessary, submit joint opinions.

4. *The European Council shall regularly assess the threats facing the Union in order to enable the Union and its Member States to take effective action³⁴.*

3. EU CSDP structure, instruments and agencies

‘3.1. HR/VP. According to Article 18 and 27 of the Treaty on the European Union, the High Representative conducts the Common Foreign and Security Policy and contributes by his/her proposals to the development of that policy, presides over the Foreign Affairs Council and he/she is one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. Moreover, the High Representative represents the Union in matters relating to the CFSP. In addition, the HR exercises authority over the European External Action Service and over the Union delegations in third countries and at international

³³ Treaty on European Union

³⁴ Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, EU Official Journal C 326 , 26/10/2012 P. 0001 - 0390



The 18th International Scientific Conference
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Braşov, November 9th-10th 2023



organisations. Last but not least, the HR has responsibilities as regards the three European Union Agencies established in the field of CFSP/CSDP.

Since 2001 services and institutions has been created to ensure the design and the implementation of Petersburg actions outside the European Union territory. Specifically, in December 1999 Helsinki European Council, where all of ESDP instruments were integrated into the European External Action Service, the European Union has gradually set up a network of services and institutions of secured institutional buildings for the implementation of the ESDP.

3.2. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) meets at the ambassadorial level as a preparatory body for the Council of the EU. Its main functions are keeping track of the international situation, and helping to define policies within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) including the CSDP. It prepares a coherent EU response to a crisis and exercises its political control and strategic direction.

3.3. The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body set up within the Council. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defense of the Member States, who are regularly represented by their permanent military representatives. The EUMC provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU.

3.4. In parallel with the EUMC, the PSC is advised by a **Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM)**. This committee provides information, drafts recommendations, and gives its opinion to the PSC on civilian aspects of crisis management.

3.5. The Politico-Military Group (PMG) carries out preparatory work in the field of CSDP for the Political and Security Committee. It covers the political aspects of EU military and civil-military issues, including concepts, capabilities and operations and missions. It prepares Council Conclusions, provides Recommendations for PSC, and monitors their effective implementation. It contributes to the development of (horizontal) policy and facilitates exchanges of information. It has a particular responsibility regarding partnerships with third states and other organisations, including EU-NATO relations, as well as exercises. The PMG is chaired by a representative of the High Representative.

3.6. The Security and Defense Policy Directorate (SECDEFPOL) is the EEAS Directorate responsible for coordinating and managing the EEAS overall contribution to addressing external security threats and supporting efforts to implement the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defense.

This includes work on strategic issues and policy areas including cyber security, CBRN, hybrid, maritime security, counter-terrorism, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms export control, as well as defense policy and initiatives (such as the Strategic Compass) aimed at deepening defense cooperation and developing civilian and military capabilities to enhance the EU's role as security and defense provider able to address both long-standing and new security threats and contribute to global peace and security. It is also responsible for fostering partnerships on security and defense with third countries and international and regional organisations (e.g. UN, NATO, African Union) and negotiates agreements with third countries on the participation in EU CSDP missions and operations.

The Directorate consists of five divisions dealing with: Security and Defense Policy (SECDEFPOL.1), Partnerships and Task Force NATO (SECDEFPOL.2), Counter-Terrorism



The 18th International Scientific Conference
**“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”**

Braşov, November 9th-10th 2023



(SECDEFPOL.3), Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Export Control (SECDEFPOL.4), and Space (SECDEFPOL.5).

3.7. The Integrated approach for Security and Peace (ISP) Directorate ensures effective coordination of an EU response throughout the different phases of the conflict, from early warning and horizon scanning to political-strategic planning for crisis management and stabilisation, as well as on the security of EU citizens in crisis zones as appropriate. ISP ensures that the EU response is conflict sensitive and based on a proper analysis with a focus on delivering stabilisation and peace.

The Directorate consists of the Secretariat for the Partnership for Security and Stability for the Sahel (P3S) and of five Divisions: Integrated approach, methodology and implementation (ISP.1); Conflict Prevention and Mediation Support (ISP.2); Integrated Strategic Planning for CSDP and Stabilisation (ISP.3); Consular Affairs (ISP.4) and European Peace Facility (ISP.5).

3.8. The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) - working under the direction of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) - is the site of collective (multi-disciplinary) military expertise within the European External Action Service (EEAS). As an integral component of the EEAS's Comprehensive Approach, the EUMS coordinates the military instrument, with particular focus on operations/missions (both military and those requiring military support) and the creation of military capability. Enabling activity in support of this output includes: early warning (via the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity - SIAC), situation assessment, strategic planning, Communications and Information Systems, concept development, training and education, and support of partnerships through military-military relationships. Concurrently, the EUMS is charged with sustaining the EU OPSCEN and providing its core staff when activated.

3.9. The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), which is part of the EEAS, is the permanent structure responsible for an autonomous operational conduct of civilian CSDP operations. Under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee and the overall authority of the High Representative, the CPCC ensures the effective planning and conduct of civilian CSDP crisis management operations, as well as the proper implementation of all mission-related tasks.

3.10. The Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) was established on 8 June 2017 with the aim of enabling the EU to react in a faster, more efficient and effective manner as a security provider outside its borders. The MPCC is responsible for the operational planning and conduct of the EU's non-executive military missions. It now commands the EU Training Missions (EUTM) in Mali, in Somali, in Central African Republic and Mozambique. On 19 November 2018, the Council agreed to give the MPCC the additional responsibility to be ready also to plan and conduct one executive military operation of the size of an EU Battlegroup.

3.11. The European Defense Agency (EDA) of the Council of the European Union supporting the development of defense capabilities and military cooperation among its MS (except Denmark). It was set-up in July 2004, its Steering Board meets at the level of defense ministers. The Agency is headed by the HR/VP and is based in Brussels. The EDA enables and facilitates defense cooperation among its Member States for the whole life-cycle of a capability including cooperation in research and technology as well as procurement or training.

The EDA's initial main missions are to develop defense capabilities; promote defense research and technology (R&T); foster armaments co-operation; and to create a competitive



The 18th International Scientific Conference
“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”
Braşov, November 9th-10th 2023



European Defense Equipment Market as well as to strengthen the European Defense, Technological and Industrial Base.

In May 2017, following a Long Term Review (LTR) initiated by the Head of the Agency, Defense ministers agreed to reinforce EDA’s mission by strengthening its role as the main instrument for intergovernmental capability planning and prioritisation in Europe; as the prime forum and coordinator for the whole lifecycle of capability development; and as Member States’ central interface and gateway towards EU institutions and stakeholders.

The Agency has signed Administrative Arrangements with Norway (2006), Switzerland (2012), the Republic of Serbia (2013) and Ukraine (2015) enabling them to participate in EDA’s projects and programmes.

3.12. The European Security and Defense College (ESDC) was established in 2005, with the aim of providing strategic-level education in Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). It followed thorough need analysis and experimentation phases. The creation of the ESDC was to give the CSDP a training and education instrument which actively promotes a European security culture.

3.13. The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) is an EU agency dealing with the analysis of foreign, security and defense policy issues.

It was set up in January 2002 as an autonomous agency under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to enrich the strategic debate inside and outside Europe. Based in Paris, with an antenna in Brussels, the EUISS is now an integral part of the new structures that underpin the further development of the CFSP/CSDP.

The Institute’s core mission is to provide analyses and fora for discussion that can be of use and relevance to the formulation of EU policy. In carrying out that mission, it also acts as an interface between European experts and decision-makers at all levels.

EUROPEAN UNION SATELLITE CENTRE

3.14. The EU Satellite Centre (SatCen) was founded in 1992 and incorporated as an agency into the European Union in January 2002 to provide geospatial intelligence products and services in the context of the CFSP and, in particular, the CSDP, primarily through the analysis of data from Earth observation satellites. Based in Torrejón de Ardoz, Spain, the EU SatCen is now a fully operational agency of the EU in the field of space and security. The EU SatCen is becoming the leading provider of security-related geospatial information products and services in the EU and is fully connected to the EU CFSP/CSDP structures as well as all relevant development and cooperation actions in the space and security domain.

The SatCen is currently supporting the EEAS, EU Member States, the European Commission, Third States and international organisations such as the UN and NATO in decision-making in the field of CFSP/CSDP. Prime beneficiaries of SatCen services are EEAS bodies and CSDP missions and operations.

The SatCen is funded by the EU Member States. It is governed by a board consisting of representatives of all EU Member States, which approves its budget and work programme. It is under the supervision of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the operational direction of the High Representative of the Union³⁵.

³⁵ EU CSDP instruments, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/csdp-structure-instruments-and-agencies_en



The 18th International Scientific Conference
**“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”**
Braşov, November 9th-10th 2023



3.15 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) signals a remarkable shift in European defense cooperation. Foreseen in the unborn European Constitution in the form of the European Defense Union, it evolved into a form of enhanced cooperation and was included in the Lisbon Treaty, articles 42.6 and 46 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Through it, member states have the capacity to advance towards ‘further integrating and strengthening defense cooperation within the EU framework’ by making binding commitments (EEAS 2018). It can be used to enable ‘increased defense spending, improve force commitments for EU operations and stimulate European defense equipment programmes’. PESCO has become a trademark of the goal to foster the EU strategic autonomy identified in the 2016 EU Global Strategy and can be interpreted as a sign of advancing the ‘internal logic of integration’ in the fields of security and defense, leading to ‘increasing convergence’ in these areas.³⁶

3. 16. Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD) objective is to provide MS and the EU with a picture of the existing defense capability landscape in Europe and to identify potential cooperation areas. The idea is that over time, this will lead to a gradual synchronisation and mutual adaptation of national defense planning cycles and capability development practices. Which, in turn, will ensure a more optimal use and coherence of national defense spending plans. CARD is a ‘pathfinder’ for collaborative capability development projects while, of course, avoiding duplication of work with NATO.

After a first trial run in 2017/2018, the first full CARD cycle was launched in 2019 and completed in November 2020 with a final report submitted to Defense Ministers meeting in EDA’s Steering Board³⁷.

4. EU Security and Defense Strategy evolution

On 12 December 2003 the summit in Brussels adopts a European Security Strategy (ESS). The aim of the document was to achieve a secure Europe in a better world, identify the threats facing the EU, define its strategic objectives and set out the political implications for Europe.

For the first time since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council held a thematic debate on defense on December 2013. It identified priority actions for stronger cooperation for increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of Common Security and Defense Policy, for enhancing the development of capabilities and for strengthening Europe's defense industry.

In June 2016 it was released the EU Global Strategy under the title 'Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe' reflects the collective MS views and offers a strategic vision for the EU's global role. In these challenging times, both for Europe and globally, the strategy highlights common ground and presents a way forward.

The EU will promote peace and guarantees the security on its territory. However, to promote the EU’s principles, five priorities have been appointed:

-the first priority refers to the security of the EU. Many threats endanger the citizens and the territory of the Union. The 21st century has new challenges – energy insecurity, terrorism and

³⁶ PESCO Official site: [https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/EU-defense-initiatives/permanent-structured-cooperation-\(PESCO\)](https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/EU-defense-initiatives/permanent-structured-cooperation-(PESCO))

³⁷ EDA official site, [https://eda.europa.eu/what-EU-do/EU-defense-initiatives/coordinated-annual-review-on-defense-\(card\)](https://eda.europa.eu/what-EU-do/EU-defense-initiatives/coordinated-annual-review-on-defense-(card))



The 18th International Scientific Conference
“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”
Braşov, November 9th-10th 2023



climate changes are only some of them. The aim of this strategy is to promote peace and security within and beyond its border.

- the second priority is the societal resilience of Eastern and Southern parts of the Union. Investing in the resilience of state and societies to the stretching into Central Asia and to Central Africa is in the interests of the citizens of the EU. The Union should build good relations with its neighbours in order to avoid any kind of conflicts.

- the third priority is the integrated approach to conflicts. The vital interests are threatened when violent conflicts erupt. There are different kind of threats from conflicts which appears near the territory of the European Union and which should be solved. Although none of the conflicts, such as those in Syria or Libya, can be solved by the EU only. On the other hand, it does not mean that through comprehensive agreements and international partnerships the Union cannot help in achieving peace.

- the fourth priority is the cooperative regional order. Voluntary forms of regional governance offer states and peoples the opportunity to manage security concerns better.

- the fifth priority of the EU's Global Strategy is the global governance for the 21st century. A lot of conflicts and threats appear near the European Union, which should be avoided. The European Union is committed to a global order based on international law including human rights, sustainable developments and lasting access to the global commons.

Initiatives that have followed since the publication of the EUGS include the Implementation Plan on Security and Defense (IPSD), the cooperation initiatives between the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led by the President of the European Council, and the Commission's European Defense Fund (EDF). These initiatives have found in the EUGS the vehicle through which discussions take place. Implementation of the three elements is ongoing.

The IPSD included references to three major current initiatives, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD), the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), among others.

I conclude that the EU security and defense strategy has changed over time and 'the motivation for new strategic thinking became more defensive, based on security threats, the diminishment of internal cohesion and an unstable internal and external environment, which also revealed a consciousness that 'the world did not want to be like us Europeans anymore'³⁸.

Instead of portraying the EU as a force for good, the EUGS acknowledges that the first interest of the EU is to 'promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and territory'³⁹, thus fully integrating the link between internal and external security. Citizens' protection becomes a prominent objective and replaces the traditional approach of the EU as an entity projecting values and providing security internationally. the EU 'will not strive to export its model, but rather seek reciprocal inspiration from different regional experiences. Pursuing a new framework of 'global governance for the twenty-first century'⁴⁰ replaces the ESS's 'effective multilateralism'.

³⁸ The EU global strategy: the dynamics of a more politicized and politically integrated foreign policy/ Esther Barbé & Pol Morillas/ Barcelona Centre for International Affairs

³⁹ EU Global Strategy, 28 June 2016, p 14

⁴⁰ Ibidem, p.39



The 18th International Scientific Conference
**“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”**

Braşov, November 9th-10th 2023



5. FUNDING CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS AND SECURITY AND DEFENSE INITIATIVES

5.1. EUROPEAN DEFENSE FUND supports collaborative, cross-border research and development in the area of defense. The Fund contributes to the development of the resilience of the Union and its Member States and the protection of its citizens. A budget of close to €8 billion for 2021-2027 is dedicated to the European Defense Fund. €2.7 billion to fund collaborative defense research and €5.3 billion euros to fund collaborative capability development projects complementing national contributions.

The European Defense Fund is a key enabler for a more secure and competitive Europe by supporting innovative technologies and enhancing the competitiveness of the European defense technological and industrial base, Member States will get state-of-the-art equipment meeting their defense needs.

The EDF is implemented through annual work programmes structured along 17 thematic and horizontal categories of actions, which have been shaped to remain stable during the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027.

5.2. EUROPEAN PEACE FACILITY

On 22 March 2021, the Council adopted a decision establishing the European Peace Facility (EPF), an off-budget fund worth approximately €5 billion for the period 2021-2027, to be financed through contributions from EU member states. It replaced the Athena mechanism, previously used to finance operational common costs of individual EU military CSDP missions and operations (i.e. HQ, personnel transport, force protection costs etc.).

Pillars:

a) Operations Pillar

The operations pillar finances the common costs of Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions and operations - having military or defense implications under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)- in accordance with Articles 42(4) and 43(2) of the Treaty on European Union.

b) Assistance Measures Pillar

The assistance measures pillar finances Union action for third states, regional or international organisations, in accordance with Articles 28 and 30 of the TEU, aimed at strengthening military and defense capacities and supporting military aspects of peace support operations.

Funds mobilised:

- €3.1 billion, provide in 6 tranches to Ukraine under the EPF (last tranche 16OCT22);
- €89 million to the Mozambican Armed Forces;
- €15 million in support of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission to Mozambique (SEP22);
- €25 million to strengthen the capabilities and resilience of the Nigerien Armed Forces (18JUL22);
- €120 million in support to African Union mission in Somalia in addition to the €65 million mobilised in 2021 (6JUL22);
- €40 million for the benefit of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova (30JUN22);
- €6 million to the benefit of the Balkan Medical Task Forces, to strengthen the military medical capabilities of 6 countries (10JUN22);
- €600 million for three-year Assistance Measure in support to African-led Peace Support Operations conducted by the Multi-National Joint Task Force against Boko Haram (MNJTF);



***The 18th International Scientific Conference
“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”
Braşov, November 9th-10th 2023***



- 2DEC21, fits assistance measures in support of Georgia (€12.75 million), the Republic of Moldova (€7 million), Ukraine(€31 million), and the Republic of Mali(€30 million).

5.3 CFSP budget is financing Civilian missions being part of EU Common Budget.

6. EU STRATEGIC COMPAS FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY

The EU FAC endorsed the EU Strategic Compass on 21 March 2022 while the Council has formally approved the document on 24 March 2022. EU aims to become a more assertive security and defense actor by enabling more robust, rapid and decisive action, including for the resilience of the Union and its mutual assistance and solidarity.

‘The Strategic Compass marks a high level of ambition for EU security and defense agenda by:

- ✓ Providing a shared assessment of EU strategic environment, the threats and challenges EU face and their implications for the EU;
- ✓ Bringing greater coherence and a common sense of purpose to actions in the area of security and defense that are already underway
- ✓ Setting out new ways and means to improve EU collective ability to defend the security of EU citizens and our Union;
- ✓ Specifying clear targets and milestones to measure progress’⁴¹.

6.1. OBJECTIVES established by the Strategic Compass

EU commits to the following concrete priority actions in four work strands:

ACT

EU needs to be able to act rapidly and robustly whenever a crisis erupts, with partners if possible and alone when necessary.

EU will:

1. Reinforce its civilian and military CSDP missions and operations by providing them with more robust and flexible mandates, promoting rapid and more flexible decision-making process and ensuring greater financial solidarity, while also promoting close cooperation with European-led ad hoc missions and operations. EU will strengthen its civilian CSDP through a new Compact allowing for a faster deployment, also in complex environments;

2. Develop an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity that will allow EU to swiftly deploy up to 5000 troops into non-permissive environments for different types of crises;

3. Strengthen our command and control structures, in particular the Military Planning and Conduct Capability, and increase EU readiness and cooperation through enhancing military mobility and regular live exercises, in particular for the Rapid Deployment Capacity.

SECURE

EU needs to enhance its ability to anticipate threats, guarantee secure access to strategic domains and protect own citizens.

EU will:

⁴¹ Council of the European Union - A Strategic Compass for Security and Defense - For a European Union



The 18th International Scientific Conference
**“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”**

Braşov, November 9th-10th 2023



1. Boost its intelligence capacities, such as the EU Single Intelligence and Analysis Capacity (SIAC) framework to enhance its situational awareness and strategic foresight;
2. Create an EU Hybrid Toolbox that brings together different instruments to detect and respond to a broad range of hybrid threats. In this context, EU will develop a dedicated toolbox to address foreign information manipulation and interference;
3. Develop the EU Cyber Defense Policy to be better prepared for and respond to cyberattacks; strengthen EU actions in the maritime, air and space domains, notably by expanding the Coordinated Maritime Presences to other areas, starting with the Indo-Pacific, and by developing an EU Space Strategy for security and defense.

INVEST

EU needs to invest more and better in capabilities and innovative technologies, fill strategic gaps and reduce technological and industrial dependencies.

EU will:

1. Spend more and better in defense and improve its capability development and planning to better address operational realities and new threats and challenges;
2. Seek common solutions to develop the necessary strategic enablers for EU missions and operations, as well as next generation capabilities in all operational domains, such as high-end naval platforms, future combat air systems, space-based capabilities and main battle tanks;
3. Make full use of Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defense Fund to jointly develop cutting-edge military capabilities and invest in technological innovation for defense and create a new Defense Innovation Hub within the European Defense Agency.

PARTNER

EU needs to strengthen its cooperation with partners to address common threats and challenges.

EU will:

1. Reinforce strategic partnerships with NATO and the UN through more structured political dialogues as well as operational and thematic cooperation. EU will also increase its cooperation with regional partners, including the OSCE, AU and ASEAN;
2. Boost cooperation with bilateral partners that share the same values and interests such as United States, Norway, Canada, UK and Japan. Develop tailored partnerships in the Western Balkans, the EU eastern and southern neighbourhood, Africa, Asia and Latin America;
3. Develop an EU Security and Defense Partnership Forum to work more closely and effectively with partners to address common challenges.

This is why this Strategic Compass sets out an ambitious but achievable plan to strengthen EU security and defense policy by 2030. The case for a new impetus on EU security and defense is compelling: a more hostile environment and wider geopolitical trends call for the EU to shoulder a greater share of responsibility for its own security.⁴²

CONSIDERATIONS:

As declared by the HR/VP, Mr. Borell, in his statement of 21 March 2022, the Strategic Compass gives the European Union an ambitious plan of action for strengthening the EU's security and defense policy by 2030.

⁴² Ibidem as 17



***The 18th International Scientific Conference
“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”
Braşov, November 9th-10th 2023***



EU collective action in security and defense aiming to defend its own interest, project its presence in the world, and promote security in its neighbourhood and with its partners has become more urgent and compelling due to the changing geopolitical environment. The document attempts at setting objectives and a new level of ambition for EU as a security and defense actor. ‘It has been admitted that without the necessary military capabilities and the credible threat of using them or sharing them with partners, the EU’s non-military toolbox only goes no more than deterrent. The US presidential elections planned in 2024, were an additional reason for EU MS to act together before it becomes too dangerous not to be prepared’⁴³.

The strategic compass is based on the first ever threat analysis, to which the intelligence services of the 27 EU MS contributed, and a structured dialogue phase amongst EU member states, EU institutions and experts.

The analysis emphasises the impact of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the danger Russia may pose to EU and the lack of strategic foresight. ‘The threat posed by China to the multilateral rules-based order seems not to be fully taken into consideration, and also the relevance to Europe of what will surely be the centre of gravity in the 21st century: the Indo Pacific The document essentially characterises the EU's security and defense ambitions as that of regional – not a global – power’⁴⁴.

The strands of work have been identified as being key to the assignment at hand: i) crisis management – ‘act’; ii) resilience – ‘secure’; iii) capability development – ‘invest’; and iv) international cooperation – ‘partner’.

i) ACT

There are several elements that could reinforce EU ability to act:

- the RDC needs to be supported by ‘more flexible decision-making arrangements and an extended scope of common costs’. A definition of these procedures and instruments are to be defined otherwise, there is a real risk that this upgraded EU battlegroup concept will remain only a paper;

- it should be clarified the degree of mandate flexibility and the pool of financial, material and human resources available when EU will decide to implement CSDP missions/ operations under article 44 of the TEU. The Strategic Compass does not address how to combine these initiatives more effectively or enlarge and strength MPCC;

- increased use of the EPF to provide arms and munitions to non-EU country partners or jointly fund military equipment for CSDP operations must be improved upon.

ii) SECURE

- The existing toolboxes must be strengthened operationally, and new administrative frameworks must be created in order to provide all spectrum of interventions, ranging from humanitarian aid and disaster relief, through cyber, hybrid and space to arms control and nuclear non-proliferation;

- the focus should be on the establishment of EU hybrid rapid response teams to assist MS, CSDP missions and partners in countering hybrid threats, also on the strengthening EU’s cyber diplomacy toolbox and the creation of a new toolbox to address and counter foreign information manipulation and interference;

⁴³ The EU’S Strategic Compass a guide to reverse strategic shrinkage? CEPS Policy Insights No 2022-14 / March 2022
Steven Blockmans, Dylan Macchiarini Crosson, Zachary Paikin

⁴⁴ Ibidem, 19



The 18th International Scientific Conference
**“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”**

Braşov, November 9th-10th 2023



- a clear protocol concerning MS contribution to the preparedness and resilience of EU’s ‘intelligence-based situational awareness’ through the single intelligence analysis capacity (SIAC) remains to be negotiated.

- improving the application of existing initiatives through a more integrated approach.

iii) INVEST

- setting a political deadline for the fulfilment of EU MS more binding commitments under PESCO – including increasing defense investment expenditure to 20 % of total defense spending and reaching the 2 % of GDP spending threshold;

- revision of the capabilities planning scenarios on the basis of the headline goal process in order to better reflect the types of operations the EU and its MS are capable of carrying out and the strategic capabilities that they each should invest;

- the VAT waiver, EDF bonus and new financing solutions through the European Investment Bank must be accompanied by a top-up of the EDF to contribute to further progress in the six domains identified by the capability development plan: the main battle tank, European patrol class surface ship, soldier systems, defense in space, anti-access area denial capacities and countering unmanned aerial systems, and enhanced military mobility.

- ensuring complementarity and synergy across the defense innovation initiatives: the NATO Investment Fund, Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic, EDF, EDA Defense Innovation Hub and Commission Defense Innovation Scheme.

iv) PARTNER

- despite its talk of being a global actor EU remains in fact more of a regional order-maker.

- within the Strategic Review there are not so much substance and detail on the EU’s partnerships with individual countries and regions

- Nothing is said regarding the need for a new pan-European security architecture and whether the EU believes that the OSCE’s role in upholding the continental order should be revitalised⁴⁵.

There remain major political obstacles to rationalizing European defense. What should amount to a largely practical and pragmatic effort often descends into an ideological dispute over “strategic autonomy” or national sovereignty. Bureaucratic discussions erupt between ministries of defense, NATO, and the European Union over roles and responsibilities. National defense industries also each have their privileged place within national capitals and push for their interests, which are often at odds with creating a more integrated European defense landscape⁴⁶. The United States can also play an obstructive role. Many European countries are reliant on U.S. security guarantees, giving the United States tremendous influence over the direction of European security⁴⁷.

For many EU MS the two main efforts are NATO’s defense planning process (NDPP) and the European Union’s capability development process, which involves several institutions but is led by the European Defense Agency (EDA). While there is some degree of synchronization between them—“ensuring the coherence and complementarity of each other’s defense planning processes” has been a goal of EU-NATO cooperation since at least 2016—it has not been sufficient to prevent the fragmentation and

⁴⁵ Center for Strategic and International Studies, Transforming European Defense, August 2022

⁴⁶ Ibidem, 21

⁴⁷ German Marshall Fund (GMF) and Bertelsmann Foundation, 2021 Transatlantic Trends: Transatlantic opinion on global challenges (Washington, DC: GMF and Bertelsmann Foundation, June 2021), https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/TT2021_EU_Version.pdf.



The 18th International Scientific Conference
**“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”**

Braşov, November 9th-10th 2023



duplication discussed above ⁴⁸. The Strategic Compass may provide through partnership strand a better approach to align these processes and emphasizes joint development of capabilities needed, especially for those most relevant for collective defense.

The European Union should have a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) to deal with all new challenges. CSDP should be implemented by EU through its dedicated structure, instruments and agencies in an integrated approach. Only when the Union will express its opinion with one voice the problems could be solved. Only when the Union will act together the threats can be managed.

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⁴⁸ “Relations with the European Union,” NATO, last updated July 26, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm.



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“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
IN THE 21st CENTURY”
Braşov, November 9th-10th 2023***



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